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It is often held to be definitive of consciousness that there is something it is like to
be in a conscious state. A consensus has arisen that ‘is like’ in relevant ‘what it is
like’ locutions does not mean ‘resembles’. This paper argues that the consensus is
mistaken. It is argued that a recently proposed ‘affective’ analysis of these locutions
10 fails, but that a purported rival of the resemblance analysis, the property account, is
in fact compatible with it. Some of the implications of this argument are briefly
explored: it is suggested that the meaning of ‘what it’s like’ does not, in itself, have
any special bearing on consciousness, and that the implications for the so-called
‘hard problem’ of consciousness are deflationary.
15
1. Introduction
Following Thomas Nagel (1974), the notion of ‘what it’s like’ (WIL)
has in recent years acquired a central place in discussions of con-
sciousness: indeed, it is often held to define what it is to be a conscious
subject that it is ‘like something’ to be that subject and held to define
20 what it is to be in a conscious state that it is ‘like something’ to be in
that state.1 As part of this development, a consensus has grown up that
‘is like’ in relevant WIL locutions does notmean ‘resembles’.2 A typical
sentence that is held to resist the resemblance gloss would be
(1) There is something it is like for me to see red.
25 In a recent paper in this journal, Daniel Stoljar offers an ‘affective’
account of the meaning of WIL statements: according to his story
(2016, pp. 1173, 1176), a statement of the form
(2) There is something it is like for me to c,
1 See, for example, Chalmers (1996, pp. 4–6, 103–4; 2010, pp. 5, 104); Byrne (2004, §1); Kirk (2005,
p. 58; 2017, pp. 73, 77, 134, 141–2, 153–4); Stoljar (2016, pp. 1188–91). See further Farrell (2016, pp. 51–2).
2 See, for example, Nagel (1974, p. 170 n. 6); Lewis (1999, p. 265); Lormand (2004, pp. 311–
22); Hellie (2004, pp. 352–6); Snowdon (2010, pp. 17–21); Farrell (2016, p. 52); Stoljar (2016,
pp. 1184–5); McGrath (2017, p. 13); cf. Hacker (2002, p. 161); Janzen (2011, p. 279).
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where ‘c’ is a suitable psychological predicate, means roughly:
(3) There is some experiential way in which my c-ing affects me.
In the course of his argument, Stoljar rejects a number of rival con-
struals of the WIL locution: one of these is the resemblance analysis;
5 another reads (2) as saying that my c-ing has some property. My main
aim in this paper is to show that the consensus on the meaning of WIL
locutions is mistaken: ‘what it’s like’ does mean ‘what it resembles’.
But I shall also argue that, while Stoljar’s affective analysis of WIL talk
is unsatisfactory, the ‘property ’ account can be accommodated.
10 Because WIL talk is central to contemporary discussions of conscious-
ness, one would expect that a correct understanding of this talk would
have important implications in the philosophy of mind. I think that
this is indeed the case. I will mention what I think those (deflationary)
implications are in my final section.
15 Prima facie, the idea that WIL locutions do not introduce the idea
of resemblance ought to seem odd. Consider the following wh-
questions:
(4a) Whom is s/he like?
(4b) Which one is it like?
20 (4c) Where is it (this place) like?
(4d) When is it (this time) like?
These questions all ask after resemblances. So when one comes to
(5) What is it like?
one would naturally expect it to follow suit. Against this expectation,
25 the consensus says that (5) patterns not with (4) but with
(6) How is it?
which seems to ask for a specification, not of a resemblance, but of a
property or properties. Supporters of the consensus appeal to the
OED, which imputes a ‘special idiomatic force’ to (5), and states
30 (Like, adj., A.I.b): ‘The question What is he (or it) like? means
“What sort of man is he?”, “What sort of thing is it?”, the expected
answer being a description, and not at all the mention of a resembling
person or thing’. Stoljar agrees: the question
(7) What is Chicago like?
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is, he tells us, ‘asking for the way that Chicago is; it would be accept-
able to say in response that it is cold or sports-crazy ’ (2016, p. 1171).3
But this is too simple as it stands. Certainly (7) can be answered by a
specification of properties, but it can also be answered by a compari-
5 son, as in:
(8a) (It is like) London,
(8b) (It is like) no other city you’ve ever visited.
Here the parentheses indicate optional material. Whether or not this
material is included, the availability of (8)-style answers to (7) shows
10 that ‘is like’ in (7) at least can mean ‘resembles’: for otherwise the
questioner in (7) could in turn respond to (8) with ‘I didn’t ask you
what (other cities) Chicago is like’. But I assume that this would be an
unacceptable response. So, the OED’s ‘not at all’ goes too far. How
should we react to the availability of these different styles of response
15 to (7)? It seems overhasty to conclude, as Stoljar does, that cases like
(7) show that ‘there is a non-comparative use of “like” in English’
(2016, p. 1171), and leave matters there: we need first to settle the
relation between the two styles of answer to (7). Perhaps the compara-
tive style of answer gives the logical form of the other; or perhaps the
20 two are in some sense equivalent. Ab initio we would expect a resem-
blance account to enjoy semantic priority. After all, the idiomatic use
that the OED claims for (5), if it really does involve a distinct sense, is
a development from the historically original sense of the adjectival
‘like’, which introduces resemblance.4 And indeed several writers
25 who reject a resemblance analysis of ‘like’ in (5) concede that its literal
meaning in (5) is comparative.5 So we need to be open to the possi-
bility that the so-called idiomatic use of (5) is explicable in terms of
that original, literal sense. Perhaps the idiom does not after all import
semantic novelty.
30 If ‘like’ in (5) and (7) does not introduce resemblance, what is its
formal semantics? Stoljar does not declare on this, but refers us (2016,
3 So too Hellie (2004, pp. 336–41, 357–8); Lormand (2004, p. 309).
4 According to OED the relevant form of ‘like’ is derived from OE gelic, itself a descendant
of Proto-Germanic galiko-, which is composed of ga- (= with, corresponding to Latin con-/
com-) + liko- (= body, form; cf. OE lic = corpse, Lyke-wake Dirge, lych-gate, German Leiche
etc.), so is precisely analogous to Latin conformis, and yields gleich in modern German. The
leading definition reads: ‘Having the same qualities or characteristics as some other person or
thing; of approximately identical shape, size, colour, character, etc., with something else;
similar; resembling; analogous’.
5 Lewis (1999, p. 265); Lormand (2004, pp. 318–19).
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p. 1171 n. 15) to two accounts in the literature, implying that either of
these will do: Eric Lormand’s predicator-functor analysis, and Benj
Hellie’s propredicate analysis. So, to test the credentials of a supposed
non-comparative ‘like’, we need to examine these. I take them in turn.
5
2. The predicate-functor analysis
Lormand’s account (in his 2004) runs, in outline, as follows. He first notes
what he styles a grammatical oddity. In relevant WIL sentences, such as
(9) S’s having M is like something for S,
where S is a subject and M a suitable mental state, Lormand tells us
10 that ‘“something” is best specified by predicates, not terms’, but
‘predicates typically cannot grammatically follow “is like”’ (2004,
p. 309). For in answer to the question ‘What is it like?’, we typically
respond with, say, ‘fatiguing’, not ‘fatigue’; but ‘is like fatiguing’ is not
regarded as grammatically acceptable, though there are, Lormand
15 notes, exceptions, such as ‘is like new’. He then suggests (ibid.,
p. 310) that this ‘oddity ’ is best explained by analysing (9) as
(10) For some F, S’s having M is F-like for S.
In Lormand’s story, (10) is then further analysed as
(11) For some F, S’s having M has the appearance of being F for S,
20 which in turn gets analysed as:
(12) S’s having M itself perceptually appears some way to S.
In (10), ‘like’ is a functor, taking a predicate as input and outputting
another predicate. Lormand argues that a resemblance construal of
‘like’ in this role fails.
25 Before considering Lormand’s argument on this last point, we may
note two difficulties with the alleged grammatical oddity. First, the
linguistic data do not unequivocally support Lormand’s assertion that
‘something’ in (9) is best specified by predicates, not terms. Just as we
can respond to (7) with (8), so we can extend (9) to a discourse that
30 incorporates a term specification of ‘something’ in (9). Suppose that
M is the experience of seeing a brilliant red object. We might then say
that S’s having M is like something for S, namely (like) (hearing) the
sound of a trumpet.6 Again, the bracketed expressions indicate op-
tional additions, and they are independent options: you can have
6 Cf. Locke Essay III, 4, 11 (1975, p. 425).
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either, both, or neither. If ‘like’ is omitted (and whether or not
‘hearing’ is included), we have specification by term (noun phrase).
Secondly, Lormand suggests that a resemblance understanding of (9)
which respects the allegedly exclusive specification of ‘something’ by
5 predicates requires us to take it as generalizing over ways of being, and
this, he says, ‘yields logical gibberish’ (ibid., p. 320) when factored into
the resemblance analysis of (9), namely:
(13) S’s having M is similar to some way for S.
But, even by his own lights, Lormand has underexpressed (13): if
10 predicates genuinely introduce ways of being, as he told us, then we
should have not (13) but
(14) S’s having M is similar to some way of being for S,
which makes good sense. We can in turn take (14) to be equivalent to:
(15) For some F, S’s having M is similar to S’s being F.
15 Again, this argument indicates that Lormand’s starting observation,
that ‘something’ in (9) is best specified by predicates, not terms—that
is, noun phrases—is incorrect: ‘a way of being’ and ‘ways of being’ are
noun phrases.
Suppose, now, that we provisionally accept Lormand’s analysis of
20 (9) as (10): what is his case against a resemblance construal of ‘like’ in
(10)? It is that this construal does not make good sense of ‘[adjective]-
like’ in (10) because S’s havingM ‘may appear (to have the property) F
but is hardly similar to (the property) F’ (2004, p. 311). There are two
problems with this argument. First, it assumes the correctness of
25 Lormand’s analysis of (10) as (11) (and of (11) as (12)); but as Hellie
has shown (2007a, pp. 443–4, 452–9) we should reject that analysis.
Secondly, and more importantly, it presupposes too simple a reading
of (10). We can approach this point by noting that Lormand concedes
(2004, p. 311) that a resemblance construal is correct for ‘[noun]-like’
30 phrases, such as ‘electron-like particle’, which refers to (the property
of being) a particle that resembles an electron. But of course some
‘[noun]-like’ expressions do not unpack in that neat way. A spider-like
motion is a motion that resembles not a spider but a spider’s motion;
the ‘cat-like tread’ of Gilbert and Sullivan’s Penzance pirates is a tread
35 that resembles not a cat but a cat’s tread; Shakespeare’s ‘saint-like
sorrow’, ‘Christian-like conclusion’, ‘swan-like end’, ‘soldier-like
phrase’, ‘giant-like rebellion’, ‘infant-like abilities’, ‘priest-like fasts’
(and Keats’s ‘priest-like task’) all unpack in a similarly indirect way.
So too, in the case of ‘[adj]-like’ phrases, a grim-like smile (an
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example that Lormand takes from the OED) is not a smile that re-
sembles grim—that collocation of words is not even grammatical—or
grimness, but a smile that resembles a grim smile. These examples all
illustrate a standard brachylogy or ellipse: both these terms denote the
5 omission from surface syntax of semantically significant elements; so,
for example, at the end of Horace’s Postumus ode (II, 14), the wine
that you have carefully hoarded only for your heir to squander is said
to be ‘richer than pontifical feasts’, by which is meant ‘richer than
<the wine drunk at> pontifical feasts’. Such brachylogy is common in
10 natural language. Consider this conversation involving the term of
crucial interest to us:
Me: Did you know David wrote over a hundred comments on a
recent student essay?
You: That is so like David.
15 Here you mean that writing over a hundred comments resembles not
David but certain other things he does. In general, ‘It is just/so like S
to V’ means that V-ing resembles not S but S’s typical (or most inter-
esting) actions. A resemblance construal of (10) may appeal to this
kind of brachylogy and analyse it as saying that S’s having M resem-
20 bles, not F or F-ness, but S’s being F, for some F. That is to say, (10)
gets analysed as (15), with a suitable restriction on the domain of the
quantifier. (I shall return to this point directly.) And it is worth
pointing out, given that Lormand relies so heavily on the authority
of the OED, that it offers resemblance readings of all three of ‘[adj]-’,
25 ‘[noun]-’, and ‘[adv]-like’ phrases.7
Lormand also considers a resemblance construal of (9) that does
not follow his own favoured analysis of it as (10), namely:
(16) S’s having M is similar to something for S.
He rejects this analysis on the basis that it does not make sense of the
30 ‘optional detachability ’ of ‘for S’ (2004, p. 318). The suggestion is that
while
(17) For some F, S’s having M is F-like
is easily heard as abbreviatory of (10), and so derivatively of (9),
(18) S’s having M is similar to something
35 is not easily heard as abbreviatory of (16), and so of (9). That,
Lormand says, is because (18) is too trivial (ibid., p. 319; cf. pp. 311,
7 Cf. Hellie (2007a, pp. 453–7).
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320): everything is similar, in some respect, to everything else. An
obvious reply to this is to say that resemblance claims are typically
made with tacit domain restrictions, to be gathered from the context.
Lormand concedes this point, but he thinks that no such restrictions
5 are in play with ‘something’ generalizations (ibid., p. 319). However,
that is untrue. If I have an unusual experience and say ‘Hmm. This is
similar to something—what?’, I do not expect my interlocutor to reply
‘Well of course it’s similar to something: everything is. Indeed, every-
thing is similar, at some level of abstraction, to everything’. Depending
10 on the context of my remark, some restriction on the domain of the
quantifier will be operative. What I probably mean is that this is
similar to some experience that I have already had. So, with suitable
domain restrictions in place there is no difficulty hearing (18) as
abbreviatory of (16), and so of (9), if (9) is being analysed as (16).
15 (9) and (16) talk about a mental state’s being like, or similar to,
something for S. The discussion so far has presupposed that we under-
stand this relativization. But do we? Surely, one wants to protest,
something is either like something else or it is not, period. What
can it mean to say that x is like, or similar to, y—for S? That seems
20 to make as little sense—at least, as little obvious literal sense—as the
assertion that the cat is on the mat for me, or that the pressure and
volume of a gas are inversely related for you. Well, one general sense
that can be extracted from locutions of the form ‘For S, p’ is ‘S believes
that p’. Stoljar notes (2016, p. 1187) that we say things like ‘To/for me,
25 Alice was the best player’, where we mean ‘I think that Alice was the
best player’. And, concerning the relativization in (16), Lormand
writes, on the resemblance theorist’s behalf, that ‘presumably, to ask
whether [certain mental states] are similar to something “for me” is to
ask whether they are similar to something to me, that is, whether I
30 believe they are similar to something’ (2014, p. 319).
But the resemblance theorist should reject the proffered assistance,
for whether an experience of mine is like or similar to something
(else)—and that is what, according to this theorist, really concerns
us in (9) (and (16))—is a quite objective matter, not to be settled by
35 whether I believe it to be like something. There is no entailment in
either direction between my believing an experience of mine to be like
something and its actually being so. Indeed, I suggested above that,
assuming Lormand’s analysis of (9) as (10), (10) in turn should be
analysed by the resemblance theorist as (15); and in (15) the relativ-
40 ization ‘for S’ that is found in (9) and (10) (and (14)) has disappeared,
which might suggest, assuming that (15) is a good analysis of (10) (and
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(14)), that it was doing no useful work in (9) and (10) (or (14)).8 One
possibility is this: the sense that we are trying to extract from (9) and
(10) (and (14)), and which according to the resemblance theorist finds
adequate expression in (15), has no role for the operator ‘S believes
5 that…’; assuming that the ‘for S’ relativizations in (9) and (10) (and
(14)) can only deliver that operator if they have a semantic role to play
at all, and since we do not want that operator, we simply ignore the
‘for S’ relativization in giving our analysis of (10) (and (14)) in (15).
Against that reductive strategy, one might consider an alternative con-
10 strual of the ‘is like something for me’ locution, as applied to an
experience, according to which it involves the empiricists’ idea of an
‘inner theatre’, that is, the idea that my experience is itself the object of
an inner gaze.9 Indeed, Lormand tells us that he favours this model of
experience, and he glosses ‘for’ in the relevant relativizations as ‘in the
15 presence or sight of ’ (2004, pp. 311–12, 322–3). So it might look as
though the relativizations of (9), (14), and (16) commit us to that
model. But that seems as unsatisfactory an upshot as finding a role in
our analysis of WIL locutions for the ‘S believes that…’ operator.10
I shall leave the matter there for the moment, in order to complete
20 my discussion of the semantics of WIL expressions; but we shall return
to the status of the relativization in sentences like (9) and (16) later. Our
conclusion from the discussion of this section is this. There is nothing
in the analysis of ‘like’, in relevant WIL locutions, as a predicate func-
tor, as least as Lormand develops that analysis, that need worry resem-
25 blance theorists. Lormand favoured an analysis of (9) as (10);
alternatively, (9) might be analysed as either (14) or (16). The resem-
blance theorist can accept any of these moves: if (9) is analysed as either
(10) or (14), these in turn will be glossed by that theorist as (15). (15) and
(16), whichever of these we end up with, need to be understood as
30 subject to suitable domain restrictions; but that is a standard and un-
problematic feature of the use of quantifiers in natural language.
3. The propredicate analysis
Hellie defends a view according to which, in statements such as ‘e is
like something’, ‘“like” is used as a device that syntactically transforms
8 Cf. Stoljar (2016, p. 1194).
9 See Hume, Treatise I, 4, 6 (1978, p. 253).
10 On both these points I am in agreement with Stoljar (2016, pp. 1186–8, 1193–5).
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a pronoun into a propredicate’ (2007a, p. 447), and he applies the
analysis in particular to the phrases ‘like this’ and ‘like that’. He rejects
a resemblance construal of such phrases for reasons that I will explain,
and rebut, below (§4). Rather, on his account, ‘like this’, though syn-
5 tactically complex in the relevant uses, is semantically simple, being
employed in an equivalent way to the semantically simple propredi-
cates ‘thus’ and ‘so’. Accordingly, Hellie regards ‘Cheney is like that’ as
a variant of ‘Cheney is thus’, and just as we can subject the latter to
quantification into the ‘thus’ position, getting ‘Cheney is somehow’,
10 so we can do the same with the former, getting ‘Cheney is like some-
thing’ or the raised ‘There is something that Cheney is like’.
But a problem immediately strikes us: as the quantificational ex-
amples show—and in fact the syndrome recurs under all the routine
syntactic operations—‘like’, unlike ‘thus’ and ‘so’, both of which move
15 without leaving a trace, does not move. So whereas in the case of
‘thus’ and ‘so’ ‘Cheney is thus/so’ is transformed to ‘Cheney is some-
thing’ or ‘Cheney is somehow’, where no trace of ‘thus’ or ‘so’ re-
mains, we find that ‘Cheney is like that’ becomes ‘Cheney is like
something’ or ‘There is something that Cheney is like’, where ‘like’
20 stays put. So, also, we have ‘What is Cheney like?’; ‘Cheney is like
what?’; ‘Whittington knows what Cheney is like’ (ibid., pp. 447–8).
Similarly, when ‘like’ combines with noun phrases, or when it is suf-
fixed to an adjective (or noun or adverb), it again stays put under
quantification (and other syntactic operations): so ‘Chicago is like
25 London’ and ‘His smile was grim-like’ become ‘Chicago is like some-
thing/somewhere’ and ‘His smile was like something’ respectively.
And in the rare cases where ‘like’ combines with adjective phrases,
we observe the same phenomenon: so ‘The car is like new’ is trans-
formed to ‘The car is like something’. Hellie’s response to these syn-
30 tactic phenomena is despairing: ‘I don’t know how to explain this
syntactic behaviour… syntax does weird things sometimes’ (ibid.,
p. 448). But that is clearly unsatisfactory. The explanation is obvious,
and the despair unnecessary: ‘like this’, ‘like that’, and ‘like something’
are not only syntactically but also semantically complex. And the nat-
35 ural reaction to that fact is to say, with the resemblance theorist, that
‘like’ introduces resemblance. As Hellie admits, ‘“like” is a real syn-
tactic stick-in-the-mud!’ (ibid., p. 448): the obvious explanation of the
syntactic behaviour of ‘like’ is that it carries a proprietary semantic
payload, and the obvious content of that payload is resemblance.
40 Once we have got clear on this point, we may then, in accordance
with the position I have already started to develop in response to
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Lormand, say that the resemblance theorist is not forced to analyse the
discourse
(19) A: What is Cheney like?
B: Secretive
5 either as being ill-formed or as representing B as propounding the
absurdity that Cheney resembles the property of being secretive; we
can construe it as saying that Cheney resembles a secretive person (in
respect of secretiveness, we must add for full explicitness). For, again,
you can reply to the question what N.N. is like by saying that s/he is
10 like no one you’ve ever met before. The comparative approach har-
monizes the various syntactically admissible responses to such a ques-
tion by discerning brachylogy in answers that deploy a simple
adjective phrase. How the brachylogy is filled out will depend on
context. Hellie cites from the OED the sentence ‘He refused to keep
15 his royal promise; kings are like that’ (ibid., p. 451). Here the resem-
blance theorist will, having glossed ‘are like’ as ‘resemble’, fill out the
second clause by supplying unvoiced elements, to yield ‘kings resemble
<people who behave in> that <way>’. Hellie objects to discerning
semantic complexity in ‘like that’ that we will then find ourselves
20 saying ‘not that “Lear is like that” predicates of Lear that he has the
indicated feature, but that he has some feature related to the indicated
feature’ (ibid.). But this objection begs the question: the resemblance
theorist will say that ‘like that’ introduces semantic complexity and
that ‘like’ refers to the resemblance relation, so that we indeed want a
25 relational analysis of ‘Lear is like that’.
This takes us to an important taxonomic point. Hellie makes the
objection I have just quoted in the context of criticising Lormand’s
predicate-functor analysis, and his criticism is designed to show that
‘like’ in ‘like that’ is not a predicate functor, on the basis that ‘like that’
30 is semantically simple. As we have seen, his argument fails: ‘like that’ is
semantically complex. And in fact resemblance theorists are free to
adopt the predicate-functor analysis; they will then offer a supplemen-
tary story that, departing from Lormand, preserves the resemblance
meaning of ‘like’. But they can also accept from Hellie that ‘like that’
35 is a propredicate. So the predicate-functor and the propredicate ana-
lyses are not, as Hellie supposes, competitors. They are not competitors
because they are analysing different things: the predicate-functor view
analyses just the word ‘like’; the propredicate view analyses the whole
expression ‘like that’ (and similar). It is entirely compatible with the
40 propredicate view that, within the complex expression ‘like that’, ‘like’
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serves as a predicate functor. In fact, Hellie accepts that ‘like [PRED]’
is a predicate functor (ibid., pp. 452–3): he just wishes to treat ‘like
this’ and its congeners as idiomatic exceptions to the rule. I am sug-
gesting that there is no need to make any exceptions. The upshot of
5 the discussion of this and the previous section is that both the predi-
cate-functor and the propredicate analyses, when rightly understood
and applied to their appropriate analysanda, are correct; but neither
threatens the resemblance construal of ‘is like’ in the relevant WIL
constructions.
10
4. Rebuttal of further arguments against the resemblance
analysis
I have already (§2) considered, and rejected, Lormand’s arguments
again a resemblance construal of relevant WIL phrases. In this section,
I shall look at a number of further arguments against this construal
15 offered by Hellie (2004) and Stoljar (2016). Hellie’s first argument goes
as follows. Suppose someone utters
(20) My couch is coloured like this,
while demonstrating a red object. Hellie says that, in this context, (20)
‘may just mean the same as’ the non-comparative
20 (21) My couch is coloured red.
Hence, ‘intuitively, “like” does not mean “similar to”’ (2004, p. 353).
But (20) and (21) do not mean the same: they have quite different
semantics, on anyone’s view. In context, of course, they may at some
suitably abstracted level of semantic analysis be equivalent; but that
25 does not show that ‘like’ does not mean ‘similar to’. (Actually, it
should be ‘similarly to’: see the next point.) Many pairs of sentences
that are semantically quite distinct are, at an appropriate level of ab-
straction, equivalent in a given context.
Hellie’s second argument is that ‘coloured’ can be followed by an
30 adjective, as in (21), whereas ‘My couch is coloured resembling that’ is
unacceptable; ‘by contrast, [(20)] does not suffer from this problem’
(ibid., p. 353). But here we must observe that ‘like this’ often functions
adverbially (‘She ran like this’), and that is how it works in (20); simi-
larly, in (21), ‘red’ is an adverb. In fact, in older English an explicit –ly
35 adverb was often used in predicative constructions (‘My couch is col-
oured redly ’). Whereas now we tend to say ‘it sounds odd’, formerly
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one could say ‘it sounds oddly ’,11 and we still say ‘it reads oddly ’ and
not ‘it reads odd’. So the right resemblance analysis of (20) will be ‘my
couch is coloured similarly to this’.
Hellie’s third argument is that ‘to understand the utterance of
5 [(20)], one’s audience must merely determine which colour one is
talking about. By contrast, to understand an utterance of (for in-
stance) “my couch is similar in colour to that material body”, one’s
audience must (i) determine which material body in the region of
ostension one is talking about, and (ii) determine what its colour is’
10 (ibid., p. 353). But to understand (20) you need to grasp which col-
oured object is the relevant relatum. The speaker cannot simply gesture
at a disembodied colour; you cannot directly demonstrate the univer-
sal redness—which, being an abstract object, is in any case (pace Plato)
not red. Even if there is a pure colour sample to hand, say in a dec-
15 orator’s chart, the speaker must still demonstrate a physical object,
perhaps a piece of paper that is coloured in a particular way. So there
is no such disanalogy between the cases as Hellie attempts to establish.
Ostending a red colour-sample is less liable to be misunderstood than
ostending an object that is only partly red and has other salient prop-
20 erties, but, as Wittgenstein taught us, even the most favourable con-
ditions for ostension presuppose background conventions of
understanding and so can, in easily imaginable circumstances, misfire.
The point here is that in both of Hellie’s cases the audience must carry
out both tasks (i) and (ii), however automatic either or both of these
25 tasks may, in context, be.
Hellie’s fourth argument is that ‘The couches here are red’ can be
continued by ‘couches that are coloured like that please me’, where
‘like that’ functions anaphorically, replacing ‘red’ (ibid., p. 354). But
note here again that ‘like that’ is adverbial: the anaphora is enthyme-
30 matic, depending on an implied ‘redly ’ contained in the covert step
‘so the couches here are coloured redly ’. Here too the resemblance
theorist will analyse ‘like that’ as ‘similarly to that’, where ‘that’ dem-
onstrates a property instance. The instance is spread over several
couches in the example, but that (contra a suggestion of Hellie’s:
35 ibid., p. 353) is unproblematic. (Parallel remarks apply to a further
example that Hellie introduces in which ‘like that’ is a bound variable:
ibid., p. 354.)
Stoljar offers three arguments against the resemblance analysis of
relevant WIL phrases. The first appeals to examples like (7) and his
11 See, for example, Shakespeare, The Tempest 5.1.200.
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gloss on them. According to the second, the question ‘What is it like to
see red?’ does not call for resemblances, but for ‘various properties
that seeing red might have or might be associated with’. Thirdly, ‘one
can know what an event resembles without knowing what it is
5 like…For example, someone who has never eaten a peach and does
not know what it is like may still know (for instance because they have
heard it on good authority) that eating a peach resembles something
else, for example, eating a nectarine’ (2016, p. 1184).12
Take the third point first. Here Stoljar’s assertion is simply ques-
10 tion-begging, and the illustration that follows the assertion does not
supply an independent argument for it. Against Stoljar, the resem-
blance theorist will say that, if you have eaten nectarines but not
peaches and you ask ‘What are peaches like?’ or ‘What is the taste
of a peach like?’, it is informative to be told ‘They are like nectarines’
15 or ‘It’s like the taste of a nectarine’, where ‘like’ introduces resem-
blance. At least, these answers tell you something about what the taste
of peaches is like. But do they tell you what it is really like? In the
background of Stoljar’s third argument there lies, of course, Frank
Jackson’s Knowledge Argument, according to which someone who
20 has not eaten a peach does not know what it is really like—does not
know it ‘from the inside’, or something of the sort. The idea is that
there is some piece of knowledge—concerning the experiential content
of tasting a peach—which someone only acquires on first tasting a
peach. We need not rule here on the right response to the Knowledge
25 Argument. Suppose that there is something that you cannot know
unless you have tasted a peach. Still, you can discover what the taste
of a peach is like by eating a nectarine. Or, if sheer propositional
knowledge (of the sort that Jackson’s Mary can acquire in her
black-and-white room) suffices for the relevant knowledge, then you
30 can gain knowledge of what the taste of peaches is like by being reli-
ably informed that it resembles the taste of nectarines. To maintain
that the only way you can find out what the taste of peaches is like is by
eating a peach would be, in effect, to introduce a special, technical
sense of ‘what it’s like’; but Stoljar tells us that he is not doing this.13
35 For, as far as ordinary language goes, you can find out what peaches
taste like by ascertaining resemblances.
Ordinary language licenses such utterances as ‘If you want to find
out what peaches taste like and have none to hand, try a nectarine.
12 Cf. Snowdon (2010, p. 20); McGrath (2017, p. 13).
13 Stoljar (2016, pp. 1183–4). See further §7 below.
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That will tell you what peaches taste like, because the tastes are very
similar’. To insist that only a peach can really taste like a peach, or
even that only this peach can really taste like this peach, would be to
misuse language. A thing cannot be like itself except in a degenerate
5 sense. That is because likeness normally implies (numerical) differ-
ence.14 When, in Hamlet, Marcellus asks of the ghost of old Hamlet
‘Is it not like the King?’ and Horatio replies ‘As thou art to thyself ’
(1.1.61–2), Stephen Greenblatt remarks on the strangeness of Horatio’s
response, for ‘Marcellus is not “like” himself; he is himself ’ (2001,
10 p. 211). To suggest that an experience, or its content, is like itself par
excellence and only in a secondary sense like other things would get
matters back to front: if ‘like’ is being used ordinarily, the primary
sense in which it is like something to have an experience is that in
which having that experience is like something else—perhaps, though
15 not necessarily, having another experience.
Here it might be objected that being informed that peaches taste
like nectarines can only tell you what it is like to taste a peach if, as the
objector might put it, you already know what nectarines taste like: are
we to apply the resemblance analysis again to this latter ‘like’? Well,
20 why not? The worry, I suppose, is that a subject might come to know a
pair or even a whole network of resemblances without having had any
of the relevant experiences, and so without knowing, as the objector
wants to say, what any of the experiences are like. But here we need to
recall just how much is presupposed to knowledge of empirical re-
25 semblances: in order to know that peaches taste like nectarines, or that
violas look like violins but are slightly bigger,15 one needs to grasp the
relevant concepts, and it is plausible that only a subject who enjoys a
considerable range of experiences—and also, plausibly (at least in
culturally more sophisticated cases, such as the viola/violin one),
30 who possesses language—will do so. Experience and language tie
down what otherwise threatens to be a free-floating network of re-
semblances in such a way that we can be sure that the subject really
does know what is going on. We should not forget how much is built
into, say, the knowledge of what a violin is: no doubt it would be
35 wrong to insist that anyone who can be credited with that knowledge
must have seen a violin, or a picture of one, but, if not, many similar
14 Poole (1987, p. 116). Frege famously made a similar point about correspondence (1918–19,
p. 60).
15 McGrath’s example (2017, p. 13).
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experiences and much contextual cultural knowledge will be requisite.
Once all that empirical richness is in place—so once we can be sure
that the subject really does know what a violin is—then it is inform-
ative for him or her to be told that violas look like (resemble) violins.
5 That tells the subject what a viola is like (at least visually). So the
resemblance theorist can insist that, given appropriate experiential
and linguistic context, knowledge of resemblances does tell you what
something is like. Putting it the other way around, the difficulty for
the resemblance theorist’s opponents is this: the more they set things
10 up so that knowledge of resemblances does not suffice for knowing
what something is like, the more they risk undermining the premisses
of their case, because the less likely they make it that the subject
satisfies the requisite conditions for grasping the concepts involved
in knowing the resemblances in the first place.16
15 Stoljar’s first two arguments are variants of one another: in effect
they both say that the ‘What is it like?’ question asks after properties,
not resemblances.17 And it must be agreed that, as we have already
noted, such questions are often answered by specifying properties.
When I said above, in connection with the dialogue (19), that the
20 answer given there is, in effect, an abbreviation of ‘<Cheney resem-
bles a> secretive <person>’, with the unvoiced elements here ren-
dered explicit, someone might object that, though the reply is
elliptical, the completion of the ellipse should be: ‘<Cheney is a>
secretive <person>’. And this is the right place to mention a fact
25 stressed by Stoljar and others, namely, that English WIL expressions
are often translated into other languages as ‘how’ expressions, so in
effect (5) comes out as (6): in German, for instance, ‘What is it like?’
is rendered ‘Wie ist es?’, which seems to ask after properties rather
than resemblances.18 How should the resemblance theorist tackle this
30 point?
16 As I have implied in this discussion of Stoljar’s third argument, the resemblance theorist
need take no particular line, for these purposes, in response to the Knowledge Argument.
Whichever way the verdict falls on whether Jackson’s Mary needs to see red things in order to
grasp the concept red (see here Daly (1998); Kirk (2005, p. 65)), she can be told what red
things are like by being given resemblances. (Of course, if we insist that in order to grasp the
concept red Mary must see red things, then we will also say that in her black-and-white phase
she cannot understand—or perhaps can only partially understand—these explanations.)
17 So too Hellie (2004, pp. 337–8).
18 Stoljar (2016, p. 1170); Snowdon (2010, p. 21).
Mind, Vol. 00 . 0 . 2017  Gaskin 2017
A Defence of the Resemblance Meaning of ‘What it’s like’ 15
5. The property and affective accounts
Despite his appeal to properties in his first two arguments against the
resemblance theory, Stoljar rejects what he calls the ‘property ’ account
of WIL locutions, which analyses
5 (1) There is something it is like for me to see red
as
(22) For some F, my seeing red is F.
Stoljar objects (2016, p. 1185) that, while (1) entails (22), the reverse
entailment does not hold: my seeing red can have all sorts of proper-
10 ties (including contextually salient ones) without its being like any-
thing for me. This recalls Lormand’s objection to (16), and the
response here can be the same: we operate with domain restrictions.
That applies not only to (22) but also to what would be the resem-
blance theorist’s analysis of (1), namely:
15 (23) There is something it resembles for me to see red.
Stoljar considers this response (ibid., pp. 1185–6) and replies that,
whereas sentences like (1) are routinely used, both on their own and
in inference, to report certain quite narrowly individuated facts about
experience, (22)—and presumably he would extend the point to
20 (23)—is not. He claims that, by contrast with the property account
(and presumably also the resemblance account), his analysis explains
these routine uses. But the explanation he offers (ibid., p. 1178) is
bogus: it is achieved by building into his account the point that
WIL sentences are stereotypically used with a narrowly experiential
25 content. (This is Stoljar’s hypothesis (H2): ibid., p. 1176.) But this
tactic simply shifts the burden of explanation. Neither Stoljar’s ac-
count nor the property and resemblance accounts explain why the
experiential use of WIL sentences is stereotypical; they merely take it
for granted. But then, should any of the accounts we are considering
30 have to explain this fact of usage? The property and resemblance
theorists can agree that ‘What it is like’ typically means ‘What it is
experientially like’, and can say that the domains of the relevant prop-
erties and resemblance relations in (22) and (23) have to be restricted
accordingly. It is just a fact of usage that ‘What it is like’ has come to
35 be employed in this way, at least in some contexts (though not, by any
means, in all),19 and the property and resemblance theorists are no
19 Snowdon (2010, pp. 23–4).
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worse off in point of modelling that fact in their stories than is Stoljar
with his affective account.20
So the property account is not dismissed by Stoljar’s argument.
Before we deal with the challenge that it poses to the resemblance
5 theory, let us examine his affective account in more detail. I said
(§1) that Stoljar analyses (2) as (3), but that construal in effect depends
on taking ‘for me’ in (2) to do double duty, so that (2) is construed as:
(24) For me to c is like something for me.
Stoljar argues that such ‘double indexing’ is forced by the fact that the
10 indices can be distinct: for you to have toothache can be like some-
thing for me—upsetting, say, or wearing.21 We may label the two
index positions in (24) ‘primary ’ and ‘secondary ’: the primary
index is the subject of the psychological infinitive verb in the ‘to c’
position (what linguists call ‘PRO’); the secondary index specifies the
15 subject for whom c-ing is like something. Now about the intelligibility
of the primary index there can, I suggest, be no quibble: we need a
subject of the psychological state which is being said to be like some-
thing. But how about the secondary index? Here, picking up a point
that was anticipated at the end of §2, the resemblance theorist will
20 interpose: what can it mean to say that (factoring in that theorist’s
analysis) it resembles something for me, for you (or me) to c? Does it
mean that I believe that it resembles something for you (or me) to c?
That was one possible meaning that (in effect) we extracted from the
secondary index in the earlier discussion. But I also suggested that an
25 allusion to the subject’s beliefs in an analysis of WIL locutions is, at
least in general, irrelevant. Stoljar’s glosses are little help in making
sense of the secondary index. At one point, as an analysis of ‘There is
something it is like to have a toothache’, we are offered (2016, pp. 1165,
1171–2):
30 (25) There is some way such that for y to have a toothache is that
way to x.
Here ‘y ’ occupies primary position and ‘x’ secondary, and Stoljar
distinguishes the indices prepositionally, using ‘for’ for primary and
20 Stoljar asserts (2016, p. 1177) that the verb ‘affect’, deployed in his analysis of WIL sen-
tences, is itself stereotypically used with a narrowly experiential content. Even if that were
right, it would not favour his analysis, for the reason given in the text. But it is surely wrong:
‘affect’ is used in connection with causal transactions of all sorts, and in purely physical
contexts it is generally (contra what Stoljar perhaps implies, ibid.) used without
anthropomorphism.
21 Stoljar (2016, pp. 1166–9); cf. Lormand (2004, p. 307).
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‘to’ for secondary position. But what does ‘that way to x’ mean? What
is a way to x? Stoljar does not, of course, mean a route to x. But nor
does he mean that x believes that y ’s having a toothache is such-and-
such. In cases of co-indexing (so where we have, in (25) for example, x
5 = y) that would entail an analysis of WIL expressions in higher-order-
consciousness terms, but Stoljar rejects such accounts (in my view
rightly).22
An alternative reading of the ‘for me’ relativization in (24) in its
secondary occurrence, briefly mentioned at the end of §2, is one that
10 imports the empiricists’ ‘inner theatre’. This approach also finds
higher-order consciousness present in WIL contexts, but in a different
way. It is just as unacceptable, for reasons brought out by the later
Wittgenstein, who inveighed against the temptation to ‘detach the
colour-impression from the object, like a membrane’,23 the point
15 being that we should not think of a seen colour as lifting off from
the worldly object like a peregrine ghostly film that becomes the object
of a purported inner gaze. Despite Wittgenstein’s warning, the mistake
is constantly encountered in contemporary discussions. Here is a typ-
ical example, from David Chalmers:
20 Mary looks at a red apple, and visually experiences its colour. The
experience instantiates a phenomenal property R, which we might call
phenomenal redness. It is natural to say that Mary is having a red
experience, even though of course experiences are not red in the same
sense in which apples are red. (2004, p. 270)
25 The concession made at the end of this passage does little to repair the
damage done by the introduction of the spurious notion of ‘phenom-
enal redness’. For it is not just that experiences are not red in the sense
in which apples are red: experiences are not red at all. That involves a
category error.24 If we nevertheless allow ourselves to speak of ‘red
22 Stoljar (2016, pp. 1193–5); cf. Byrne (2004, §5); Kirk (2017, p. 165). Hellie also glosses the
WIL locution as involving ‘a property which is “to” or “for” the subject of experience’ (2007b,
p. 295); but it is clear that, unlike Stoljar, Hellie does intend this to be understood as import-
ing higher-order consciousness (pp. 301–2); cf. Weisberg (2011, pp. 426–7). Stoljar’s attempt to
supply other cases where ‘to’ means something like ‘affects’ (2016, p. 1174) do not help: ‘awful
(to)’ and ‘destabilizing (to)’ are straightforward cases of expressions requiring relativization
and make sense as such, whereas ‘a way to’ and ‘a property to’, in the sense in which these
phrases are intended, look thoroughly opaque.
23 Wittgenstein (1958, I, §276, emphasis in original); cf. Byrne (2002, p. 124); Kirk (2005,
p. 55).
24 Byrne (2002, pp. 125, 128).
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experiences’, we can only intelligibly mean by that experiences of red
things in the world.
Chalmers’ mistake is brought out by his (perfectly consequential,
given his starting point) statement that there are possible worlds
5 where red objects do not cause red experiences (ibid., p. 271). Now,
in an ordinary sense such worlds are indeed abundant: they include,
for example, worlds containing red objects but no light, or no subjects
of experience, or no subjects with the right perceptual equipment, and
so in which red objects are never observed. But this is not what
10 Chalmers means: he aims to allow for the conceivability of a world
where all the right conditions are in place, but where red objects cause
not red but, say, green experiences. But this is contradictory. A red
object is an object which is such as to look red to suitably equipped
observers in suitable viewing conditions.25 So you cannot have red
15 objects that do not look red when those conditions are met. Neither
the possibility that red objects might not look red, under the appro-
priate conditions, but rather (say) green, nor the possibility that green
objects might look red (under the same conditions) makes sense. Red
objects might of course have looked green if they had been painted
20 green, but they could not have looked green while continuing to be
red: if an object looks green (under the right conditions) then it is
green. And contrariwise: if an object is green, then (under the right
conditions) it looks green. It follows that the content of ‘looks red’,
say, is fixed by ostending red objects in the world. If you ask me what
25 it is for something to look red, I respond not by inviting you to
introspect, but by demonstrating (say) a British post box and saying
‘It looks that colour’ (that is, it looks the colour which that object is).26
Chalmers is, in effect, detaching looking red from being red, which is
precisely the membrane fallacy identified by Wittgenstein in the pas-
30 sage quoted above. Put another way, it is a version of the homunculus
fallacy that is often diagnosed in the old sense-datum theory of per-
ception. So in the sense in which he intends the claim it is not, as
Chalmers thinks, ‘conceivable that when looking at red things, such as
roses, one might have had the sort of colour experiences that one in
35 fact has when looking at blue things’ (1996, p. 5). Note that merely to
say that something looks red does not itself commit the membrane
fallacy. Something looks red just if it seems to the subject, accessing the
object in the usual visual way, as though it—the seen object—is red.
25 McDowell (1998, p. 133).
26 Cf. Wittgenstein (1958, I, §275).
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There is no call to suppose, incoherently, that a ‘look’, itself coloured
redly (despite being unable to reflect light), detaches itself from the
red object, becomes the object of an inner gaze (with consequent
looming regress),27 and can vary independently of real redness.28
5 We have not so far managed to make good sense of the secondary
index in statements formed on the model of (24): I have rejected
analyses of it as introducing higher-order consciousness, whether in
the form of a belief operator or an inner gaze. In Stoljar’s affective
account of WIL locutions, we are told that the secondary index—‘to
10 (x)’, in his terminology—means ‘affects (x)’ (2016, p. 1173). Here I
think Stoljar faces a dilemma. There are two things one might mean
by ‘affects’, as it figures in (3), neither satisfactory.29 Sometimes Stoljar
seems to mean that there is some further respect in which my c-ing
affects me—that is, some respect beyond the sheer fact of my c-ing,
15 something caused by the c-ing. Thus, he glosses ‘affect’ in the required
sense as ‘influence’ and ‘bring about a change or condition in’: ex-
amples given include ‘Having the disease affects you by making you
very tired’ (ibid., p. 1173). In this sense my having toothache might
affect me by, for example, making me irritable. But that reading of (3)
20 obviously renders it useless as an analysis of (2), because it changes the
subject and introduces irrelevancy: an experience may be like some-
thing without affecting me in that ulterior sense. At other times Stoljar
means that the affecting alluded to in (3) just is the experience of c-ing
itself: you are affected by your c-ing simply by virtue of the fact that
25 you are c-ing. This is what Stoljar has in mind when he comes to
analyse a sentence such as (1): here we are told, in effect, that I am
affected by my experience in the sense that I feel something when I see
red, where ‘feel’ is interpreted broadly so as to apply to me, in this
instance, by virtue of its seeming to me that things are a certain way
30 (ibid., p. 1181).30 But all there is to say in general about how things
seem to me when I see red is that (it seems to me that) I see red. So we
have been taken round in a circle: my seeing red affects me just in the
sense that I see red. This is objectionable for a reason that is opposite
to the reason that told against the first analysis: there the analysans
27 Cf. Kirk (2017, pp. 121–2).
28 As, for instance, in Chalmers’ ‘inverted Mary ’ scenario (2004, p. 275).
29 The ambiguity may be intentional on Stoljar’s part (cf. 2016, p. 1190 n. 31), but he does
not see that it presents him with the dilemma I identify here.
30 Note that this gloss appears to be inconsistent with Stoljar’s rejection of the ‘operator’
account of WIL locutions (2016, pp. 1186–8).
Mind, Vol. 00 . 0 . 2017  Gaskin 2017
20 Richard Gaskin
went off topic; here it travels no distance from the analysandum.
(Alternatively, one might, on this horn of the dilemma, detect the
membrane fallacy: when I see red, an inner homunculus sees red.)
6. Properties and resemblance
5 The affective account is unsatisfactory, then, but the property account
is still standing as an apparent rival to the resemblance story that I
have been canvassing hitherto in this paper: we might wonder how we
should adjudicate between them. But here I propose that we need not
choose: we can have both. The key to achieving this harmony is the
10 reminder that properties just are resemblances.31 My suggestion is this.
If we ask what is meant by the statement that it is like something to see
red, the answer, in the first instance, is that what is meant is that seeing
red is similar to something, given a suitable restriction on the domain
of the quantifier. That meaning is guaranteed, I have argued, by the
15 fact that, however we may go on to use WIL expressions, we can
always recover their original, literal meaning: the question ‘What is
it like?’ can always be answered in the format ‘It is like (= resembles)
such and such’. But we can group together things that are similar in
some respect, and when we do that we get a property, for a property is
20 just the shared respect which collects similar things. In view of that, it
is no surprise that WIL locutions may be heard as compendiously intro-
ducing properties; so we arrive at a developed position in which WIL
questions, for example, can be answered by one-word property specifi-
cations. Recall (19): ‘What is Cheney like?’; ‘Secretive’. Here we may spell
25 out the derivation of the answer as follows: Cheney resembles a secretive
person in respect of secretiveness, and so is secretive. The one-word
answer is convenient; but the analysis gives its semantic aetiology.
I do not see the fact that the resemblance theorist appeals to covert
elements here as a serious cost: semanticists regularly adduce unvoiced
30 elements in the analysis of ordinary discourse; and, however we ana-
lyse the answer in (19), we will have to discern covert elements. The
property account must do so too. But if the property account were
advanced as a rival to the resemblance account it would have to be
rejected, since it does not explain why a resemblance meaning is
35 always recoverable from the WIL locution. What I suggest, however,
is that the property account is best seen not as a competitor, but as a
supplement, to the resemblance theory. At a certain stage of semantic
31 Quine (1969, pp. 116–7).
Mind, Vol. 00 . 0 . 2017  Gaskin 2017
A Defence of the Resemblance Meaning of ‘What it’s like’ 21
development, WIL locutions can be heard as asking after, or specify-
ing, properties. The original resemblance meaning of the locution is
there in the semantic background, is recoverable, and is in any case
consistent with specification by property, given that properties are
5 themselves just resemblances.
Where does that leave the secondary index in sentences like (24)? I
have rejected a higher-order-consciousness gloss on this; but (24) ap-
pears to make sense, so what does the second ‘for me’ mean? I suggest
that it can be read as restricting the range of the quantifier to resem-
10 blances, and so to properties, that concern me in the right way, whatever
that way is. (The context will decide.) That implies the rejection of an
idea mooted at the end of §2, namely, that the secondary index is se-
mantically inert. We can still say, as we wanted to say there, that (15) is
the right analysis of Lormand’s (10), itself an analysis of (9); but we will
15 need to add that the ‘for S’ relativization in (10), though superficially
disappearing in (15), is really present as a restriction on the domain of
the quantifier. We noted in the earlier discussion that this restriction
must in any case be presupposed in (15) and (16), and the point being
added here is just that the ‘for S’ relativization, though not explicit in
20 (15), in fact gets taken up into, and so is tacitly present in, that domain
restriction. (Its explicit presence in (16), which I allowed as an alternative
analysis of (9), should also be construed in this sense, namely, as a
domain restrictor.) Lormand remarks that the pain in my leg is like
something only for me—not for my leg or my medicine cabinet
25 (2004, p. 311). What that comes to is that I (not my leg or medicine
cabinet) have the experience and that the experience’s resemblances
include ones that bear relevantly on and characterize—perhaps essen-
tially characterize—my feeling. To make this clear, we can redraft (15) as:
For some relevant F, S’s having M is similar to S’s being F (where ‘rele-
30 vant’ codifies the need for suitable domain restriction on the quantifier).
7. Implications
‘Essentially characterize my feeling’: but not intrinsically characterize
it—at least not if ‘intrinsic’ is being used as a stand-in for a construal
of WIL talk that is resistant to an analysis such as I have given in
35 resemblance (and property) terms. That is often how ‘intrinsic’ is used
in the contemporary consciousness room: so, for example, Chalmers
speaks of ‘the intrinsic nature of a sensation of red’ (2010, p. 22),32
32 Cf. Weisberg (2011, p. 410).
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where he means something much more ambitious than merely that,
say, a sensation of red is more like a sensation of orange than it is like
a sensation of green.33 He means to advert to the ‘hard problem of
consciousness’, according to which what experiences are like allegedly
5 eludes physical and functional description. But if what an experience is
like is just a matter of what it (relevantly) resembles, and so, deriva-
tively, of what (relevant) properties it enjoys, such ambitions are quite
unwarranted. What we find time after time in discussions of con-
sciousness is that the WIL locution plays a pivotal role in setting up
10 a supposed ‘hard problem’ of consciousness; but we are told next to
nothing about what it means.34 Many writers are happy to say that
they are treating the WIL locution as a technical term.35 I share
Stoljar’s aversion to this approach (§4).36 After all, if ‘what it’s like’
is a technical term, it needs to be properly defined. But such a defin-
15 ition is never given: glosses along the lines of ‘the phenomenal con-
tent/intrinsic character of experience’ take us nowhere, for they are
themselves technical terms (indeed much more obviously technical
than ‘what it’s like’), and simply re-pose the demand for a definition
in plain terms. When we spell out in plain terms what ‘what it’s like’
20 actually means, as I have tried to do here, we find that there is nothing
in that meaning to support the subjectivist and dualist superstructure
that is often placed upon it: the ‘further phenomenon’37 that is sup-
posedly inexplicable by ordinary science and is said to be grounded in
the what-it’s-likeness of experience presupposes an understanding of
25 WIL talk that is based on a simple linguistic error.
Stoljar begins his paper (2016, p. 1162) by noting how surprising it is
that WIL talk has been commandeered for consciousness purposes,
given that there is nothing on the surface of the phrase ‘what it’s like’
to alert you to any such connection. I have in effect been arguing here
30 that there is nothing more to ‘what it’s like’ than what appears on the
surface. The phrase looks as though its meaning is comparative, and its
meaning is comparative. It means what it resembles—no more than
that. The phrase can be used in a context where consciousness is at
issue, of course, as it can be used in many other contexts; but when we
33 Cf. Byrne (2004, §5).
34 For an illustration, see Chalmers (2010, Essay 1).
35 See, for example, Lewis (1999, p. 326); Janzen (2011, p. 279).
36 See also Hellie (2004, pp. 336–9); Farrell (2016).
37 Chalmers (2010, p. 33).
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have to do with what an experience is like, the burden of introducing
consciousness will be borne by the explicit or implicit restriction of the
resemblances (and so properties) that interest us to experiential ones,
and not by anything in the semantics of the phrase ‘what it’s like’. In
5 itself, WIL talk tells us nothing about consciousness, and so a fortiori
nothing about a ‘hard problem’ of consciousness. When we restore its
true comparative sense to ‘what it’s like’, we see that efforts to drag-
oon WIL locutions into the service of a preterscientific solution to an
alleged ‘hard problem’ of consciousness fail, and glosses of ‘what it’s
10 like to see red’ in terms of ‘the intrinsic nature of a sensation of red’
simply risk tipping over—and in the case of some contemporary
writers do tip over—into the membrane fallacy.
Again, when Chalmers writes that ‘there is nothing it is like to be a
zombie’ (2010, p. 107), we can reply that in the ordinary and correct
15 sense of ‘is like’ this is just false. Zombies, as they are characterized in
the philosophical literature, are very similar to us indeed—in fact, they
are identical to us in all respects except, supposedly, one.38 Hence
there are plenty of things it is like to be a zombie; and the one respect
in which, allegedly, it is like nothing to be a zombie cannot, it would
20 appear, be stated. At least, WIL locutions will not do the trick: for
zombies are physically and functionally indistinguishable from normal
human beings, which means that their experiences will boast the usual
range of resemblances (properties), in fact, exactly the same ones as
ours do. Moreover, zombies will be able to verbalize, just as we can, what
25 those resemblances (properties) are: they will say things like ‘Ouch! This
toothache is really agonizing’, ‘Look how blue the sky is!’, ‘Hmm, this
feeling I’m getting is like something—what? Oh yes, it’s like that
extraordinary feeling I remember from last year’, and so on.39 There is
38 Farrell (2016, p. 52).
39 Although I do not have space to pursue the point here, it is worth noting that, as well as
the hard problem of consciousness, another potential casualty of a correct understanding of
WIL locutions is the popular idea that feelings are inexpressible. At any rate, the correct
understanding of WIL locutions does not support that idea; as far as the resemblance
theory is concerned, resemblances may all be perfectly expressible in words. Note that whether
an experience can be put into words is a quite distinct issue from whether those words can
only be understood by someone who has had similar experiences. (For the confusion, see
Hellie (2004, p. 342).) The latter may hold of a range of statements—indeed, it is probably true
that understanding most ordinary statements requires experience—but it does not follow that
the relevant experiences cannot be verbalized. Putting experiences into words often involves
demonstrating something in the world, but that is unsurprising given that experiences often
have (as we noted in the case of colour experience) worldly things as their content: cf.
McDowell (1996, pp. 56–7); McGrath (2017, p. 12). If I say ‘My experience is/was of that
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nothing left for their experiences to be like that escapes the net of or-
dinary talk about ordinary resemblances, and if we try to force the WIL
locution to express that supposed but non-existent remainder, we risk
finding ourselves, once more, in the grip of the membrane fallacy and
5 the illusion of a Cartesian inner theatre.40
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